Minors Under the Age of Seven; Incapable of Primary Negligence or Intentional Torts; Conclusive Presumption; DeLuca v. Bowden by Cross, Robert Austin
The University of Akron
IdeaExchange@UAkron
Akron Law Review Akron Law Journals
August 2015
Minors Under the Age of Seven; Incapable of
Primary Negligence or Intentional Torts;
Conclusive Presumption; DeLuca v. Bowden
Robert Austin Cross
Please take a moment to share how this work helps you through this survey. Your feedback will be
important as we plan further development of our repository.
Follow this and additional works at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview
Part of the Jurisprudence Commons, Juvenile Law Commons, and the Torts Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Akron Law Journals at IdeaExchange@UAkron, the
institutional repository of The University of Akron in Akron, Ohio, USA. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Akron Law Review by an authorized administrator of IdeaExchange@UAkron. For more information, please
contact mjon@uakron.edu, uapress@uakron.edu.
Recommended Citation
Cross, Robert Austin (1976) "Minors Under the Age of Seven; Incapable of Primary Negligence or Intentional




Minors Under the Age of Seven • Incapable
of Primary Negligence or Intentional
Torts - Conclusive Presumption
DeLuca v. Bowden, 42 Ohio St. 2d 392, 329 N.E.2d 109 (1975)
D ELUCA, THE PLAINTIFF in this action, had suffered eye injuries when
Ayers and Coffman, minors under the age of seven, had cocked and fired
a BB gun in his direction. In the subsequent complaint for damages for the
injury inflicted, DeLuca named Bowden, the owner of the gun, who on several
previous occasions allowed the two to play with it, as a defendant along with
Ayers and Coffman. The trial court, upon motion, granted summary judgment
on behalf of the two minors under seven, leaving only Bowden as a defendant.
The court of appeals, however, reversed the grant of summary judgment
for the two minor children, stating "that although a minor under the age of
seven is not responsible for damages resulting from his negligence. . . such
minor could be liable for an intentional tort ... ,,"' Upon reconsideration, the
appellate court affirmed the granting of summary judgment in favor of
Coffman, who apparently only cocked the gun. Ayers thereafter appealed
to the Ohio Supreme Court.
The only question considered by the supreme court was "whether a child
under the age of seven is liable for primary negligence or for an intentional
tort." The court noted the general incapacity of a child of this age to act with
reason and foresight,' and further expressed its own reluctance to attach blame
to a child "in any sense comparable to the blame attachable to an adult."" For
these reasons it held that such a child shall be conclusively presumed incapable
of both primary negligence and intentional tort.
In so holding, Ohio joins a distinct minority of states which follow this
view.' Previous case authority governing a young child's primary liability in
Ohio was less than conclusive, yet the sparse number of decisions indicative
of Ohio's stance espoused a view contrary to that now adopted. It had been
stated by way of dictum that "an infant is responsible for his own torts .. .6
1 DeLuca v. Bowden, 42 Ohio St. 2d 392, 393, 329 N.E.2d 109, 110 (1975).
2 Id. at 394, 329 N.E.2d at 110. 3 Id. at 394, 329 N.E.2d at 111.
4Id. at 395, 329 N.E.2d at 111. 5 See cases cited notes 25 and 47 inira.
6 Lacker v. Ewald, 8 Ohio N.P. 204, 11 Ohio Dec. 337 (C.P. 1901), affirming a demurrer of
the father of an infant (no age indicated) who wilfully killed plaintiff's dog with his father's
gun. See also Ringhaver v. Schlueter 23 Ohio App. 355, 357, 155 N.E. 242, 242 (1927), citing
Lacker in dismissing a complaint against the father of a child of tender years (no age stated)
who rolled a rubber casing over plaintiff's child during play.
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and that the question of whether a six-year-old child is capable of a negligent
act is for the jury.7 More recently, the court of appeals, although dealing with
the liability of children 13 and 14 years of age, held that a minor who commits
a tort is liable at any age.' The Ohio Supreme Court, although reversing
the decision on other grounds, affirmed the correctness of the lower court's
statement of the law.'
Thus, DeLuca clearly repudiates these earlier positions by approving an
absolute rule against the imposition of liability. The court's holding with
respect to primary negligence stems from its prior decision in Holbrock
v. Hamilton Distributing Inc."° In that case, the court found, that "in view of
the general incapacity of children under seven,"" a child of this age is
incapable of contributory negligence as a matter of law. 2 This conclusion of
incapacity, while derived from the diminished ability of an infant to appreciate
the consequences of his actions," also takes into consideration the public
policy of permitting an infant plaintiff to recover for his injuries.' The latter
consideration is lacking in DeLuca. Nevertheless, the court rejected the
significance of this factor in concluding that "the practical need for some
simple and just rule is the same in this case as in Holbrock." "
Whether or not the need is actually the same, the court chose to treat the
negligence issues in both cases on equal grounds since "the acts which
constitute negligence are the same, whether that negligence is primary or
secondary, and so too is the level of capacity and understanding necessary
to a finding of negligence. ' 16 To treat the issues otherwise, by allowing a
distinction merely from the differing status of a minor as either a plaintiff or
a defendant, could possibly lead to inconsistent results.'
7
7 Ludtke v. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. Co., 14 Ohio C. Dec. 120, 126 (1902), rev'd on other
grounds, 69 Ohio St. 384, 69 N.E. 653 (1904) (in dictum involving the question of
contributory negligence of a minor).
S Allstate Fire Ins. Co. v. Singler, 9 Ohio App. 2d 102, 104, 223 N.E.2d 65, 66 (1967)
(intentionally setting a fire to boxes while trespassing).
9 14 Ohio St. 2d 27, 30, 236 N.E.2d 79,81 (1968).
1o 11 Ohio St. 2d 185, 228 N.E.2d 628 (1967).
11 Id. at 189, 228 N.E.2d at 630.
12 Id.
13 DeGroodt v. Skrbina, 111 Ohio St. 108, 113, 144 N.E. 601, 603 (1924).
14 Bellefontaine & Indiana Ry. Co. v. Snyder, 18 Ohio St. 399, 408 (1868).
15 DeLuca v. Bowden, 42 Ohio St. 2d 392, 394, 329 N.E.2d 109, 111 (1975).
1G Id.
37 Jorgensen v. Nudelman, 45 I11. App. 2d 350, 352, 195 N.E.2d 422, 424 (1963), illustrating
that any distinction between contributory and primary negligence is absurd and inconsistent by
the following example: In an action by an infant against an infant defendant, where both are
injured and the defendant counterclaims against the plaintiff, both may ultimately be deemed
incapable of contributory negligence (because of a conclusive presumption), yet both may
theoretically recover since both are capable of primary negligence.
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Other states have established seven as the age limit with respect to
contributory negligence,"8 yet the question whether this age limit is applicable
to primary negligence is not determinable from case law in those states. Some
courts have alleviated this ambiguity by expressly providing that the age or
standard should be uniformly applied to both plaintiff and defendant minors.1"
Whether a double standard exists in other jurisdictions ° is subject to debate
due to the infrequency of decisions which involve child defendants. 2 1
DeLuca has thus formulated a consistent standard and clarified the status
of the law in Ohio. The standard adopted however does not have widespread
support. The general rule is that a child's age, intelligence, and experience
under the circumstances should be specially considered2" inasmuch as there is
a general public interest for their welfare and protection. "[T]he rule is equally
applicable to child defendants .' 2 A minority of states have set certain age
limits below which children are considered incapable of primary negligence,2 '
yet only seven states other than Ohio have set the age as high as seven.2"
The establishment of seven as the age below which negligence is legally
impossible is subject to criticism. In addition to the setting of an age at a higher
level than would be preferred,26 it has been criticized as imposing a purely
1 See, e.g., Willoughby v. Stiltz, 387 S.W.2d 10 (Ky. Ct. App. 1965) (dictum); Burns v.
Eminger, 81 Mont. 79, 261 P. 613 (1927); Walston v. Greene, 247 N.C. 693, 102 S.E.2d 124
(1958); Sexton v. Noll, 108 S.C. 516, 57 S.E. 129 (1918); cf. Bush v. New Jersey & N.Y.
Transit Co., 30 NJ. 345, 153 A.2d 28 (1959) (rebuttable presumption).
19 See, e.g., Jorgensen v. Nudelman, 45 111. App. 2d 350, 195 N.E.2d 422 (1963); Queen Ins.
Co. v. Hammond, 374 Mich. 655, 132 N.W.2d 792 (1965); Hamel v. Crosietier, 109 N.H. 505,
256 A.2d 143 (1969). Contra, Roberts v. Ring, 143 Minn. 151, 152, 173 N.W. 437, 438 (1919).
20 See generally 38 ORE. L. REv. 268 (1959), for a discussion of cases relevant to the double
standard theory.
21 Note, Contributory Negligence of Children in Indiana: Capacity and Standard of Care, 34
IND. L. 511, 512-13 n. 15 (1959), concluding, "[t]he Indiana courts generally hold that an
infant is liable for his torts, but no discussion of his standard of care has been found."
22 E.g., Singer v. Marx, 144 Cal. App. 2d 637, 642, 301 P.2d 440, 443 (1956). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283A, at 14 (1965).
23 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283A, comment (a), at 14 (1965).
24 See Ellis v. D'Angelo, 116 Cal. App. 2d 310, 253 P.2d 675 (1953) (four years); Hamel
v. Crosietier, 109 N.H. 505, 256 A.2d 143 (1969) (dictum-five and one-half); Verni v.
Johnson, 295 N.Y. 436, 68 N.E.2d 431 (1946) (four); Connor v. Houtman, 350 P.2d 311(Okla. 1960) (five); Shaske v. Hron, 266 Wis. 384, 63 N.W.2d 706 (1954) (five and one-half).
25 Hatch v. O'Neill, 231 Ga. 446, 202 S.E.2d 44 (1973) (thirteen); Jorgensen v. Nudelman, 45
Ill. App. 2d 350, 195 N.E.2d 422 (1963); Fabre v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 167 So. 2d
448 (La. Ct. App. 1964); Scottish Union & Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Prange, 154 So. 2d 623
(La. Ct. App. 1963) (dictum); Queen Ins. Co. v. Hammond, 374 Mich. 655, 132 N.W.2d
792 (1965); Seidlik v. Schneider, 122 Neb. 763, 765, 241 N.W. 535, 536 (1932) (dictum);
Kuhns v. Brugger, 390 Pa. 331, 340, 135 A.2d 395, 401 (1957) (dictum). See also Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 891.44 (1966), which states: "It shall be conclusively presumed that an infant minor
who has not reached the age of 7 shall be incapable of being guilty of contributory negligence
or of any negligence whatsoever."
26 "The weight of authority is in favor of a conclusive presumption of incapacity with respect
[Vol. 9:2
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mechanical and arbitrary standard 2 7 which does not adequately reflect the
differing rates of development exhibited by children.2s1 There remains a question
of whether any correlation between the rates of development of a child's
sense of right and wrong, and his perception of danger and judgment of
speeds exists.2 9 Such objections and considerations lend credence to Justice
Celebrezze's dissenting opinion that such a simple standard as this is
prone to reach inaccurate results."0
The greater significance of DeLuca, however, must be attributed to the
imposition of a limit on a child's liability for an intentional tort. Although
some exception is frequently applied when the negligence of a child is under
scrutiny, 1 no similar modification is accorded when the issue is one of intent.
A distinction is generally asserted by the courts that, although a minor may be
incapable of negligence due to his incapacity to foresee the consequences of
his carelessness, foreseeability is not determinative for some intentional torts
where the only intent required is that intent to do the physical act,12 or that
intent to inflict an offensive bodily contact." A lesser degree of maturity is
necessary for the latter,8 ' such that the courts cannot, as a matter of law,
declare a child incapable of forming such intent. 5
While some appellate courts in Ohio had previously adhered to this view
on the issues of trespassing children"0 and other "force type torts,"3 the
to children between three and four years of age." Annot., 107 A.L.R. 4, 100 (1937) (concern-
ing primarily contributory negligence).
27 James, The Qualities of the Reasonable Man in Negligence, 16 Mo. L. REV. 1, 24 (1951).
Is DeLuca v. Bowden, 42 Ohio St. 2d 392, 397, 329 N.E.2d 109, 112 (1975) (Celebrezze, J.,
dissenting).
29 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 16.8, at 926 (1956). See also Tyler v. Weed,
285 Mich. 460, 280 N.W. 827 (1938), in which both the majority and dissenting opinions
discuss the history, development, and reasoning of the issue of age limits for contributory
negligence.
30 42 Ohio St. 2d 392, 397, 329 N.E.2d 109, 112.
31 See notes 22 and 24 supra.
32 Allstate Fire Ins. Co. v. Singler, 9 Ohio App. 2d 102, 104, 223 N.E.2d 65, 66 (1967), rev'd
on other grounds, 14 Ohio St. 2d 27, 236 N.E.2d 79 (1968) (trespass); see Annot., 67
A.L.R.2d 570, 573 (1959).
33 E.g., Ellis v. D'Angelo, 116 Cal. App. 2d 310, 317, 253 P.2d 675, 678 (1953); Baldinger
v. Banks, 26 Misc. 2d 1086, 1087, 201 N.Y.S.2d 629, 631 (Sup. Ct. Tr. Term 1960); cf.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 16, at 27 (1965).
34 Jorgensen v. Nudelman, 45 111. App. 2d 350, 353, 195 N.E.2d 422, 425 (1963).
35 Cleveland Park Club v. Perry, 165 A.2d 485, 488 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1960).
36 See Leesman v. Moser, 32 N.E.2d 448 (Ohio Ct. App. 1935); King v. Cipriani, 32 N.E.2d
446 (Ohio Ct. App. 1935); Ludden v. Columbus & Cincinnati Midland R.R. Co., 7 Ohio N.P.
106, 9 Ohio Dec. 793 (C.P. 1900) (all three decisions finding an infant plaintiff not a
trespasser despite the courts' assertions that infants may, in other instances, be legally capable).
37 Shiflet v. Segovia, 40 Ohio App. 2d 244, 318 N.E.2d 876 (1974), in which the allegation was
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supreme court has chosen to disregard this distinction. It has instead
completely absolved infants under seven and, as a result, those persons injured
have only a limited recourse under Ohio law.3" This is contrary to the law of
most jurisdictions, which consider the question of whether an infant under
seven is capable of forming the requisite intent3" as a factual determination." °
The DeLuca court's rationale for its position rests upon the blamelessness
of the child. The court supported its rationale by analogizing to the common
law treatment of infants accused of crimes and by comparing the blame-
worthiness of an act of God with that of a child of tender years. 1 The former
reference has been discredited as a biblical departure having no legal or logical
substance, 2 while the latter is without a logical nexus between those natural
occurrences and the acts attributed to a minor. 3
CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding this vulnerable basis, the rule formulated may not be
entirely unsound when due consideration is given to the generally low
incidence of intentional injuries from this segment of the populace, the lower
risk of severe injuries, and the policy of protecting infants and young families
found sufficient to state a cause of action against a minor (no age indicated) for intentionally
throwing a rock.
31 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.09 (Page 1972), allows an action against the parents of an
infant who wilfully damages the property of the plaintiff (recovery limited to $2,000). Thus, by
its language, the legislature expresses its acknowledgment that a finding of wilful intent is
possible for the purposes of this statute.
39 Ellis v. D'Angelo, 116 Cal. App. 2d 310, 317, 253 P.2d 675, 678 (1953), which allowed an
action for battery against a four-year-old boy for pushing his babysitter. See 27 So. CAL. L.
REV. 214 (1953) for a discussion of the Ellis case.40 Weisbart v. Flohr, 260 Cal. App. 2d 281, 67 Cal. Rptr. 114 (1969) (reversing a judgment in
favor of a seven-year-old boy who fired an arrow at a girl intending to scare her-assault a
battery); Seaburg v. Williams, 16 Ill. App. 2d 295, 148 N.E.2d 49 (1958), aff'd on other
grounds, 23 Ill. App. 2d 25, 161 N.E.2d 576 (1959) (allegation that a six-year-old child set fire
to a garage was sufficient to state a cause of action for an intentional tort but not a negligent
tort); Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 664, 134 S.W. 1076, 1080 (1911) (dictum-infant
is civilly liable for damages for a trespass); Baldinger v. Banks, 26 Misc. 2d 1086, 201 N.Y.S.2d
629 (Sup. Ct. Tr. Term 1960) (six-year-old boy who pushed a girl is capable of intent for a
battery); Garratt v. Daley, 46 Wash. 2d 197, 279 P.2d 1091 (1955), aff'd, 49 Wash. 2d 499,
304 P.2d 681 (1956) (finding a child five and one-half years old liable for battery for pulling
a chair out from under the plaintiff); Huchting v. Engel, 17 Wis. 230 (1863) (six-year-old held
liable for trespass for breaking down shrubbery and destroying flowers). See also Bohlen,
Liability in Tort of Infants and Insane Persons, 23 MICH. L. REV. 9 (1924), for an historical
analysis of trespass and intent in conjunction with an infant's status.
41 DeLuca v. Bowden, 42 Ohio St. 2d 392, 395, 329 N.E.2d 109, 111 (1975).
42 W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 156 (4th ed. 1971). Furthermore, this analogy is faulty
inasmuch as the object of a criminal action is punishment, whereas the object of a civil action
is compensation. Therefore, the intent required for criminal responsibility is of a higher degree
than the intent necessary for civil liability. W. CLARK & W. MARSHALL, LAW OF CRIMES § 6.12,
at 440 (7th ed. 1967).
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from financial and legal headaches." These considerations are wholly
speculative and would not seem to outweigh the policy of allowing a party to
recover for his injuries. It has been said that the law of torts is primarily
concerned with the compensation of an injured party rather than the moral
guilt of the wrongdoer.45 This is interpreted to mean that liability should not
be imposed merely because one acts culpably but causes no injury. Yet where
injury actually results from the act of another, as long as some degree of a
wrong is evidenced, it would seem from this proposition that the law of torts
would seek to compensate for the injury incurred.
Since it is generally recognized that infants maintain the ability and
awareness to form the requisite intent, 6 only scant support has been given to
the imposition of an absolute limit on an infant's liability for an intentional
tort. 7 As Justice Celebrezze notes in his dissenting opinion, 8 regardless of the
moral culpability of an infant, it is his act which causes injury and therefore
it is he who should be held responsible. To say that an infant under seven
is incapable of a legal wrong "is to ignore common sense as well as
common experience.""
ROBERT AUSTIN CROSS
4 But see James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALE LJ.
549, 554-56 (1948), in which the author, although dealing primarily with auto-caused injuries,
suggests liability insurance more often than not covers any injuries an infant may cause.
45 W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS § 134, at 996 (4th ed. 1971).
46 See notes 22 and 24 supra.
47 See Queen Ins. Co. v. Hammond, 374 Mich. 655, 132 N.W.2d 792 (1965), where two infants
under seven were conclusively presumed incapable of both a negligent and an intentional tort
for setting a fire (two judges dissenting); cf. Hatch v. O'Neill, 231 Ga. 446, 202 S.E.2d 44
(1973) (affirming the dismissal of an action against a nine-year-old who fired a rock with a
slingshot, the court held that a child who has not reached the age of criminal responsibility [13]
is not liable for any tort) (three judges dissenting). The court based its decision on a
construction of a state statute (GA. CODE ANN. § 105.1806 [1968]) which provides: "Infancy
is no defense to an action for a tort, provided the defendant has not arrived at those years of
discretion and accountability prescribed by this Code for criminal offenses."
48 42 Ohio St. 2d 392, 397, 329 N.E.2d 109, 112.
49 Id. at 398, 329 N.E.2d at 113,
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